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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

-v-

17627

PHILLIP FRANCIS,
Defendant-Apellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The

app~llant,

PHILLIP FRANCIS, appeals from a conviction

of Burglary in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for the
~~ty ~f

Weber, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, PHILLIP FRANCIS, was found guilty by the court

sitting without a jury before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, of the
crime of Burglary on February 13, 1980 and was thereafter sentenced to a
term in the Utah State Prison pursuant to Utah Code Ann.' Section
16-6-202 (1953 as Amended) not to exceed fifteen years.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, PHILLIP FRANCIS, seeks a reversal of his conviction and a new trial.
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STATEMENTS OF FACTS
The appellant was a suspect in a burglary in Washington Terraci
which occurred on April 30. 1980.

The appellant was approached on four

occasions by two detectives of the Washington Terrace Police Department
for questioning concerning the burglary.

The detectives wanted the

appellant to submit to a polygraph test to prove his involvement in the
burglary but the appellant refused.
On November 3. 1980.

the appellant was picked up by Detective

Afuvui of the Ogden Police Department for questioning on a theft of a
silver bar from an Ogden coin shop.

The appellant was arrested and

during a subsequent search some stolen coins and some drugs were recovere1
from the appellants automobile.

The appellant was charged with theft of

the coins. possession of a controlled substance and driving on
The appellant was booked into jail.

revocatio1

A short time later Detecti•

Afuvai went to 1he jail to interrogate the appellant about some unsolved
cases.

Later on the same day the appellant was taken to the detectives

office where he was interrogated for four hours by Detective Afuvai
without assistance of counsel or anyone else.

The appellant confessed

to the theft of the silver bar and signed a statement containing his
confession in exchange for a promise not to file the three charges
which arose on that day.

The appellant was then interrogated, without

benefit of the miranda warning, again about the Washington Terrace
burglary.

There is testimony that during this period the appellant

denied any involvement or knowledge of the Washington Terrace burglarv at
the beginning of the session but after a period of time he indicated
that he Sponsored
wasn't
sure
he Funding
wanted
to provided
talk
the andburglary.
by the S.J.
Quinneyif
Law Library.
for digitization
by theabout
Institute of Museum
Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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TI1e appellar

testified during this period of time that Detective Afuvai paced the
floor and at point stopped, hitched up pants and stated that the

ltl

appellant was causing him to lose his composure.

The appellant testified

that he felt threatened and was frightened by Detective Afuvai and because
of that he confessed.

Detective Afuvai testified that during this period

that he may have raised his voice and called the appellant a liar and
that its not unusual to do so.
A few days later the appellant was taken out to Washington
Terrac2 on a traffic citation.

Detective Jensen of the Washington Terrace

Police Department had the appellant brought again to his office for

'ere(
of

1tiot

!Clll

v at

questioning about the burglary he had confessed to.

Detective Jensen,

by thisJtime, had been informed by Detective Afuvai of the appellant

confession on the burglary case.

The appellant hestitated to speak to

Detective Jensen at his office because the appellant wasn't certain he
wanted to make a statement to Detective Jensen.

The appellant supposedly

stated he felt that the office may contain some recording device, therefore
he wanted to talk somewhere outside the office.

Detective Jensen and the

appellant drove to a secluded spot where they spoke for approximately one
and a half hours about the burglary and other things.
ations

After the interrog-

the appellant finally confessed to Detective Jensen.
The appellant was then charged and convicted of burglary, a

~oond

degree felony.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONFESSION ELICITED BY DETECTIVE AFUVAI FROM THE
APPELLANT WAS A RESULT OF COERCION, INTIMIDATION AND
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
INNUENDO
ANDLibrary
THEREFOR
INVOLUNTARY
AND
THUS
Services and Technology
Act, administered by the
Utah State
Library. THE TRIAL
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING THE CONFESSION INTO EVIDENCE.

The issue is well settled that a confession which is the resuJ
of coercion, intimidation or promises, is not voluntary and therefore
inadmissible into evidence and that the use of such a confession at the
time of trial is a violation of the due process clause of the fourth
and fourteenth

amendment of the United States Constitution, Miranda v.

State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S Ctl602, 16
v.

~labama,

~

ej 2d 6J4, Blackburn

361 U.S. 199, 4L ed 2d 242, 80 S Ct, 274, Haynes v.

373 U.S. 503, 10 L ed 2d 513, 03 S ct 1336, People v. Sanchez, 451
People v. Pettingill, 573 P2d 108.

Was~

P2d 74

As the Supreme Court stated in Fikesv

Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 16 ed 2d 246, 77 S Ct 281,
,,

"The voluntary character of an alleged confession depends
upon whether the confession as a whole was made voluntarily
and without inducement or compulsion, and not whether the
particular communications contained in the confession were
voluntary or not. A confession is voluntary in law if, and
only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made. To be voluntary
the confession must be the expression of free choice by one
who, at the time he confesses, is in possession of mental
freedom to confess to or deny a suspected participation in a
crime, or to refuse to answer. The confession must not be
produced by inducement engendering either hope or fear; by
duress, intimidation, or other improper influences, or by
fraud, collusion, trickery, and subornation of perjury on
the part of those representing the state."

Thus pursuant to that holding the courts must hold inadmissible confessio

which are the product of any of the influences described above.
In reviewing a confession where there has been a claim of
involuntariness the courts must examine the totality of the circumstance
surrounding the giving of the confession to determine if there were an:-'
impermissible influences exerted upon the defendant.

Applyinr this

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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standard the court should consider all the facts attendant to the appellants

·esul1confession, State v. Hall, supra, Haynes v. Washington, supra.
According to the testimony received at the trial the following

:he events occured; the appellant was suspected of committing the Washington
Terrace burglary, however, there was not enough evidence to charge the
v. appellant.

The appellant was approached four times by a detective of the

m hshington Terrace Police Department for the purposes of obtaining a

~confession

d

7~,

~

and/or taking a polygraph.

The appellant refused each request.

!he appellant was picked up for questioning in Ogden City concerning an

v. Ogden City case.

The appellant was charged with the coramission of three

offenses on that day and was booked into
ly

i ail.

Detective Afuvai testified

that the appellant was informed of his Miranda rie;hts two times up at the

!ail, so we can assume that Detective Afuvai attempted to question the
·e
ind appellant about something but the appellant refused.
The appellant is
:ary
me then brought downstairs into the detectives office where Detective Afuvai

.n a :estified he was interrogated for some four hours. During this interrogaie
iy tion period, the appellant is pursuaded to confess to the theft of the
!ilver bar, an Ogden City case.

After the signing of the confession,

:he appellant is told he is going back to the jail, but instead the
~ellant

is taken back to the detectives office again where he is further

essior'.nterrogated about the Washington Terrace burglary.

Detective Afuvai

:ndicated that Detective Jensen of the Washington Terrace Police Department

·1u inforrnc<l him that they had attempted to obtain a confession from the

f

tance!appellant but that the appellant had refused and he asked if Detective
anv

:ruvai could get the appellant to confess.

The appellant testified that

*ing this interrogation, that he claimed he knew nothing about the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
-5Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

burglary but that Detective Afuvai, nevertheless, continued to question
the appellant.

The unrebutted testimony of the appellant was that

Detecti

Afuvai paced the room and became upset because of the appellants refusal
to implicate himself by admitting his involvment in the burglary.

The

appellant testified that Detective Afuvai then stopped, hitched up his
pants and said, "You're causing me to lose my composure."

The appellant

testified that he was intimidated by this gesture and statement and as
a result confessed.

Detective Afuvai testified that he and the appellant

were on a friendly basis and that the interrogatories went peacefully.

However, upon cross examination by the defense he conceded that he raised
his voice during the interrogations and he may have called the appellant
a liar . .,
The United State Supreme Court in Haynes v. Washington, supra,
in reversing a conviction held that where a confession is obtained as a
result of threats or other impermissible techniques that due process

h~

been violated and that "the question in each case is whether the defendar
will was overborne at the time he confessed", citing Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528, 534, 9 Led 2d 922, 926, 83 S Ct 917.

The court citedoth

cases to support its position that " ... the true test of admissability is
that the confession is made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion
or inducement of any sort."
In the Haynes case, supra, the defendant was denied the oppor
ity to call his wife or attorney for six days.

The defendant was repeat

told that there would be no phone calls until the defendant "cooperated'
(emphasis added) and signed the confession.

The court, applying the te!

announced in the cases it cited held that the confession was not the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1

:roduct of free will, but resulted from the threats of continued incomt~icado

detention and psychological pressure exerted against the defendant.
The appellant readily concedes that the actions of the state

uthorities were more grievous in the Haynes case, supra, than the facts

1

;urrounding the challenged confession before the court.

However, the

;opellant contends that when the principals cited and enunciated in Haynes,
;upra, are applied to the circumstances surrounding the appellants confession
t:hat there must be a finding that the appellants confession was a result
f the ~rnpermissible pressure exerted upon the appellant by Detective

,d\fuvai and not a product of the appellants free will.

The appellant

. ·elies upon the following factors to suppon: his contention that his will
.o resist was overborne by the pressure exerted by Detective Afuvai.

!,

11pellant refused to confess to the Washington Terrace detectives.

The
He is

rrested on another charge by Detective Afuvai and is approached twice up
t

the jail by Detective Afuvai about some cases.

anlppellant refuses to talk.

At that point the

The appellant is brought into the detectives

, ffice where he is interrogated for four hours.

During these four hours

helhe appellant is in the office with Detective Afuvai alone without means
s iescaping the pressure exerted by Detective Afuvai.

The appellant

mfesses to the Ogden City charge and signs a confession, he is then
~m back to the detectives office interrogated further,

even though

1rt11e appellant has indicated his reluctance to speak about the case.

1tc 1iring

this interrogation period Detective Afuvai raises his voice,

l" aces the floor, maybe calls the appellant a liar and finally becoming

est 1 frustrated by the appellants refusal to confess that he stops, hitches
·his pants and states, "You're causing me to lose my composure!", it's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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shortly after this that the appellant confesses.
It is clear that the appellant conceded to the pressure of
Detective Afuvai when he confessed.

There was testimony from Detective

Afuvai that the appellant was intelligent enough to recognize the consequer
of confession.

The appellant was also intelligent enough to recognize that

the state had no evidence upon which to convict him of this charge, so
we are left with the question, why did the appellant want to confess?
It is the testimony of Detective Afuvai that the appellant was informed
no deals could be made, so that could not be a motive to confess.

The

appellant contends that the confession was a result of the intimidating
gestures and innuendo of Detective Afuvai and that that is what caused
him to CODfess.

Again applying these factors to the test in Haynes,

supra, it is evident that the confession was not made voluntarily
but was brought about by oppressive circumstances the appellant found
himself in.

Therefore, the confession, not being the product of a

voluntary exercise of the appellants free will, should not have been
accepted into evidence.

The admission of the con.fe s~~ ion into evidence

was a denial of due process and therefore the conviction should be
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
POINT II
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE FURTHER QUESTIONING AFTER
INVOCATION OF APPELLANTS RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT WAS
IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT AND
THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE.
In the case of People v. Pettingill, supra, the defendant
was picked up on a burglary charge.

1he police, after informing the
-3-
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at

defendant of his rights to remain silent and right against self incrimination, attempted to interrogate the defendant, however, the defendant
invoked his rights and refused to discuss the case.

Two hours later

the same police officer approached him again, again reciting the Miranda
wamines, and again the defendant invoked his rights and refused to discuss
the case.

Another officer from another jurisdiction approached the

defendant sor.ie three days later, after ootaining some evidence and
confessions from the defendants companions, and after showing the
defendant the evidence he had obtained, recited the Miranda warning and
the defendant confessed.

The California Supreme, in reversing the

:onviction, held the police officers violated the fourth, fifth, and
·ourteen~h

amendment rights.

The court, relying on the Miranda decision

nd a string of other California Supreme Court cases, held that once an
ndividual has invoked his rights to remain silent then all interrogations
'1st cease until and unless the individual approaches the authorities

ndicating his willingness to waive his constitutional rights.

As the

upreme Court in Miranda stated,
"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is
clear.
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has
shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment
privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his
privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion,
subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning,
the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement
after the privilege has been once invoked."
Applying that holding to the circumstances before the court
·ls

apparent that the interrogations by Detective Afuvai was in violation

the protective devices created by Miranda.

The undisputed testimony

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is that the appellant was given the Miranda warning up at the jail on two
occasions.

Although there is no direct testimony that the appellant

invoked his rights, we are still left with the question, why was the
appellant ·given the warnings if there wasn't an attempt to question him
about a 'c.ase?

If the appellant hadn't invoked his rights to remain silent

and/o'r his right against self incrimination but was willing to speak to
Detective Afuvai why two warnings?

If the appellant was willing to speak

why was it necessary to take him downstairs and interrogate him for four
hours?

Even if ·Detective Afuvai attempted to speak to the appellant about

other cases and the appellant invoked his rights, Detective Afuvai, never·
theless, violated the appellants rights as set out in Pettingill, supra,
because,

~as

in Pettingill, all interrogations must cease and apparently

it did not.
Furthermore, in Miranda, the Supreme Court stated, "If the
individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questio1
ing, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogations must cease." for
"(with) out the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody
interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in produc
a statement after the privilege has been once invoked."

Again there is

unrebutted testimony by the appellant that he stated he wasn't sure he
wanted to talk about the Washington Terrace burglary.

Taking into conside

ation that the appellant has just confessed to the theft of the silver bar
the fact he is told he was being taken to jail but instead is taken bacl
to the detectives office, the fact that Detective Afuvai, who had
supposedly been the appellants friend, is now pacing the floor raising
his voice and maybe calling the appellant

a liar and the fact that the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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i?pellant is alone with Detective Afuvai who is approximately 5 foot

l

·o inches, and weighs approximately 270 pounds, it is clear that the
ippellant was indicating his desire to terminate the questioning and under
:he Miranda decision the continued questioning of the appellant was in

nt iiolation of right

to remain silent and right against self-incrimination.

Relying on the cases and facts cited above the appellant
:ontends that his confession was involuntary.

The appellant contends that

:he continual interrogations by Detective Afuvai was in violation of his

iut:ight to remain silent and right aeainst self-incrimination.
The appellant also contends that the confession was involuntary

~r-

1ecause his will to resist the pressure of Detective Afuvai was outborne
1y the

e~austing

interrogatories, the gestures and st.a1I'Ents of Detective

'fovai and the belief that a confession was the only way to escape his

1redicamen t.
tiot

or

POINT III
THE CONFESSION OF THE APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ACCEPTED INTO EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE APPELLANT WAS NOT
GIVEN A MIRANDA WARNING PRIOR TO BEING QUESTIONED ABOUT
THE BURGLARY CASE.

due

The court in People v. Pettingill, supra, stated that once
idefendant has invoked his right to remain silent that all questioning

,ide:ust cease.

This decision was based on the rational of the court that

bar:he Miranda decision required that an individual be warned of his rights

:k :gainst self-incrimination and that the individual be given an opportunity

:o invoke these rights.
1is

In the Pettingill case the defendant had invoked

right against self-incrimination and refused to confess.

The police

~tinued to interrogate the defendant for a period of time after the
the S.J. Quinney Law
Library. Funding
provided by the Institute of Museum
Library Services
nvocation ofSponsored
the byMiranda
rights
byfor digitization
the defendant.
The and
court
ruled that
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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because the defendant had invoked his rights that any further questioning
was in violation of the due process clause of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
In the case before the court, there's testimony that the
defendant waived his rights concerning the silver bar.

There is also

testimony that the defendant was not warned of his right to remain silent
nor that whatever he said could be used against him.

It cannot be argued

that the defendant was ignorant of his rights in light of fact he had been

warned just prior to the confession of the theft of the silver bar, but th1
appellant argues that he was not given an opportunity to invoke his right
to remain silent and his right against self-incrimination.
Implicit in the warnings is the opportunity to invoke the
rights outlined in the Miranda warning.

Included in the Miranda warning

is the question, "Having these rights in mind, do you wish to speak about
the matter?"

The purpose of this statement the appellant contends is to

give the defendant the opportunity to invoke his rights.

In the case befo

the court this opportunity was lacking because irnmediantly after signing
the confession of the appellant to the theft of the silver bar the interro
gations began on the Washington Terrace burglary without the benefit of th
opportunity to invoke the rights outlined in Miranda.

Therefore, the

defendant was, for all intents and purposes, deprived of his right against
self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Miranda, case.
POINT IV
THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW TO ITS FINDINGS OF FACT BY
NOT SUPPRESSING THE CONFESSION AFTER HOLDING THAT THE
CONFESSION WAS AN ATTEMPT BY THE DEFENDANT TO APPEASE
DETECTIVE AFUVAI AND AVOID INCURRING ANGER AND DISPLEASURE
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The court erred in its application of the law by not suppressing
the confession because the court indicated in its holding that it fotmd
that the defendant was attempting to appease

Afuvai in the hope

if avoiding any anger or displeasure and any physical abuse by Detective

\fuvai.

All the case law cited in thethree preceding points indicate

:hat the confession must be the product of rational intellect, Sanchez,
;11pra, made freely,

1

1

De~ective

my kind,

~he

voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of

State v. Hall, supra.

Clearly by the finding of the court

confession was involuntary, under the standard described

above,

1ecause the court specifically found that the defendant's will was over1ome by the pressure of Detective Afuvai and yet failed to hold the
:onfessigp involuntary and therefore, inadmissable.
CONCLUSION
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in receiving

o:

he appellants confession into evidence.

The appellant cites the courts

olding that the appellants confession was an attempt on the appellants
art to appease Detective Afuvai as an accurate conclusion <Jlf.. the facts

1

D

h1resented ·to the trial court.

The appellant asserts that the trial misapplie

he law" to its finding of facts because the trial court clearly found that
the confession was not voluntary.
The appellant further contends that there was clearly prejudiial error committed by the trial court in receiving the confession into
rtdence.
~race
' 11 1'.lh

The appellants refusal to give a confession to the Washington

detectives, the setting in which the confession was obtained, the
of the interrogation and the reluctance of the appellant to speak
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

~ut the crime, are indications
that Act,
the
confession
was not given
Library Services and Technology
administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

voluntarily.

That being evident, the trial court should have held that

~

the confession was involuntary and thus inadmissable.
The appellant contends that the continued interrogatories aft
the invocat.ion of his Miranda rights was a denial of due process which
made the confession -elicited for the appellant inadmissible and therefore

...

the tri?-l .court committed prejudicial error in receiving the confession
into· evidence.
The appellant asserts that because of the admission of the
confession into evidence that he was denied due process and therefore
the appellant is entitled to a reversal of the conviction and a new trial.

Respectfully Submitted,

ROGER A. FLORES
Attorney for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

